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  Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for*
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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OPINION
POLLAK, District Judge
Arthur and Jane Tubbs appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Because the
District Court looked at matters outside the complaint, we will reverse.
I.
Appellants’ amended complaint alleges that, in the spring of 2008, they refinanced
two existing mortgages, held by Wachovia Bank, with defendant North American Title
Agency serving as the settlement agent for the refinancing.  Appellants allege that they
 Section 8(b) states: “No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split,1
or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service
in connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other than for
services actually performed.”  12 U.S.C. § 2607(b).  
3
paid for various services for which Title Agency charged them at the closing.  Included in
these charges was a $150 fee ($75 per mortgage) labeled “Release Recording Fees.” 
These are averred to be fees for the recording of the release of the prior mortgages with
the county clerk’s office.  Appellants further allege that Wachovia provided a payoff
statement to Title Agency stating that it was charging $80 ($40 per mortgage) for the
same recording of the release of the mortgages with the county clerk.  Appellants allege
that Title Agency knew Wachovia was performing the recording of the release, and that
Title Agency performed no services for the $150 it charged.  Appellants claim that this
violated § 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §
2607(b).1
The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Despite the allegations
in the amended complaint that “Title Agency performed no services to earn the $150.00
fee,” the District Court found that “Title Agency’s charge was not a markup of
Wachovia’s fees, but rather a charge for its own services.”  The District Court listed a
range of potential services that Title Agency would have had to conduct, such as
obtaining payoffs statements from Wachovia, collecting money from the parties to the
settlement, making distributions to prior mortgagees, and verifying that Wachovia did
 In Santiago, we held that § 8(b) does not provide a cause of action for2
“overcharges,”–where a single entity charges more than the reasonable value of the services it
provides–but does allow a cause of action for “markups”–where a settlement service provider
charges more for services than it pays to the third-party vendor who performs the services.  417
F.3d at 386-89.
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prepare and record the release.
II.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Vallies v. Sky Bank, 432 F.3d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 2006).  In
evaluating the propriety of the dismissal, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true, and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Pinker v.
Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2002).  With limited exceptions, a
district court cannot consider materials outside the pleadings without first converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.  In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props, Inc.
Secs. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1999).
The District Court erred by going beyond the complaint to find that the $150 fee
was for services that Title Agency had in fact performed, when the complaint alleges that
“Title Agency performed no services to earn the $150.00 fee it charged Plaintiffs.” 
Because the question of whether Title Agency performed or did not perform services may
alter the analysis of whether the plaintiffs properly stated a claim under § 8(b) of REPSA,
as construed by this court in Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384 (3d
Cir. 2005),  we will reverse the District Court’s order and remand the case to the District2
5Court for further proceedings.
III.
For the reasons stated, the order of the District Court is reversed and the case
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
 Because I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Tubbses’ sole federal1
claim, I would also affirm the District Court’s decision to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367©.
1
Tubbs v. North America Title, No.  09-2757
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting
The majority holds that the District Court erred when, at the motion to dismiss
stage, it relied on materials outside the amended complaint to conclude that the Title
Agency performed services to earn the $150 fee at issue here.  I agree that the District
Court erred in this regard.  According to my colleagues, a remand is necessary because
“the question of whether Title Agency performed or did not perform services may alter
the analysis of whether the plaintiffs properly stated a claim under § 8(b)” of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).  I disagree that a remand is appropriate,
however, because the record and the briefs demonstrate that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim
under § 8(b) regardless of whether the Title Agency performed any services.  In my view,
the Tubbses’ concession that the Title Agency did not split the $150 fee with any third
party dooms their RESPA claim.   Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1
I.
The amended complaint avers that the Title Agency violated § 8(b) when it
charged an unearned $150 fee.  Significantly, the amended complaint does not allege that
the Title Agency split or otherwise shared this $150 fee with Wachovia (or anyone else);
it merely avers that the Title Agency kept this fee entirely for itself.  The amended
complaint further alleges that the Tubbses separately paid a total of $80 to Wachovia for
2the same services.   The text and structure of § 8(b) of RESPA, however, make clear that
such allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief.
A.
Section 8(b) of RESPA prohibits the giving or receiving of “any portion, split, or
percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement
service . . . other than for services actually performed.”  12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (emphasis
added).  The words “portion,” “split,” and “percentage” necessarily imply something less
than the whole amount.  These three words, in turn, modify the “charge” or fee that one
receives in conjunction with real estate services.  Thus, the plain language of § 8(b)
indicates that the statute prohibits receiving a portion of an unearned fee for real estate
settlement services; it does not prohibit the receipt of the entire, undivided fee.
Our prior cases interpreting § 8 of RESPA have recognized as much.  See Santiago
v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Section 8(b) states
that no person can accept a fraction of a charge for services provided, unless they have
actually provided services.”) (emphasis added); Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585
F.3d 753, 761 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the words “any portion, split or percentage
thereof” in § 8(b) indicated that Congress knew how to “differentiate between all charges
and a portion of those charges”).  Indeed, to hold that § 8(b) prohibits the receipt of an
entire unearned fee would render the words “portion, split, or percentage” meaningless. 
See Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1998) (we must give
3effect to all provisions of a statute “so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void, or insignificant”) (quoting Pa. Med. Soc'y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886, 895 (3d
Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  These precedents, along with the plain
language of § 8(b), confirm that a plaintiff must allege that a fee was split to state a claim
under RESPA.
My interpretation is buttressed by the structure of § 8.  When interpreting a
particular subsection, we must evaluate its language in the broader context of “the
language and design of the statute as a whole.”  Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878
F.2d 659, 671 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the operative language of § 8(b)
appears under the heading “Splitting charges.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b).   When read in
conjunction with the statutory language, Congress’s choice of a title for § 8(b) strongly
suggests that a plaintiff must allege that a defendant received some portion of a larger fee
to state a claim under the statute.  See Santiago, 417 F.3d at 389 (“Section 8(b) is titled
‘Splitting charges,’ and prohibits the acceptance of ‘any portion, split, or percentage of
any charge.’”).
Moreover, if Congress wanted to extend § 8(b) to cover situations in which a
defendant kept an entire fee, it knew how to do so.  Section 8(a), which immediately
precedes §8(b) and does not appear under the heading “Splitting charges,” does not
require a defendant to accept a “portion, split, or percentage” of an unearned charge.  See
 In support of their argument that § 8(b) should be interpreted contrary to its text,2
the Tubbses urge us to defer to HUD’s interpretation of the statute, which provides: “A
charge by a person for which no or nominal services are performed or for which
duplicative fees are charged is an unearned fee and violates” § 8(b).  24 C.F.R.
§ 3500.14(c).  HUD has also issued a policy statement in which the agency “specifically
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12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).  Instead, § 8(a) imposes liability on a defendant who accepts “any
fee, kickback, or thing of value.”  Id.  When read together, these sections suggest that
Congress intended to punish different conduct when it included the language “portion,
split, or percentage” in § 8(b) but not in § 8(a).  By giving full effect to the disparate
language of each subsection, my interpretation avoids rendering the other subsection
superfluous.
The text and structure of § 8(b) thus make clear that, to state a claim, the Tubbses
were required to allege that the Title Agency split the $150 fee with a third party.  Instead
of doing so, the Tubbses alleged that the Title Agency received a $150 fee for which it
performed no services.  In addition, the Tubbses averred that “Wachovia separately
charged Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs paid Wachovia, $40 for each mortgage” to perform the
services for which they were billed by the Title Agency.  Thus, the Tubbses alleged that
they paid two separate and distinct charges—one to Wachovia and the other to the Title
Agency—for the same service.  Because the Tubbses did not—and cannot—allege that
the fee received by the Title Agency was a smaller “portion, split, or percentage” of a
larger charge, as § 8(b) requires, I would hold that they have failed to state a claim for
relief.2
interprets §8(b) as not being limited to situations where at least two persons split or share
an unearned fee for the provision to be violated.”  66 Fed. Reg. 53052, 53057.  Because I
believe the “intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter” and we need not
defer to HUD’s counter-textual interpretation of § 8(b).  Santiago, 417 F.3d at 386 (citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)).  Likewise, we need not consider the Title Agency’s argument that the legislative
history of § 8(b) makes clear that a defendant must split a fee with a third party to be
liable.
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B.
 The Tubbses argue that our decision in Santiago made clear that a plaintiff need
not allege that a fee was split to state a claim under § 8(b).  They claim the sole inquiry
under Santiago’s interpretation of § 8(b) is whether the Title Agency actually performed a
service to earn the fee at issue.  But Santiago did not extend liability under § 8(b) that far. 
Santiago considered whether § 8(b) includes a cause of action for overcharges and
markups.  In RESPA parlance, an overcharge occurs when one performs settlement
services itself but charges a fee that is substantially higher than its reasonable cost. 
Santiago, 417 F.3d at 387; Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 53
(2d Cir. 2004).  A markup occurs when one outsources a settlement service to a third
party and charges the consumer a fee that exceeds one’s actual costs without providing
any additional service.  Santiago, 417 F.3d at 389; Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53.
In Santiago, we held that § 8(b) prohibits markups, but nowhere did we imply that
a plaintiff need not allege that a fee was split to state a claim under § 8(b).  As the Title
Agency notes, the markup at issue in Santiago necessarily included a split fee: the
6defendant charged the consumer an inflated fee, part of which was passed on to the
vendor who actually performed the service and part of which the defendant kept for itself. 
Indeed, the only practice that we found beyond § 8(b)’s grasp in Santiago was the
overcharge, which by definition included no splitting of fees.  See 417 F.3d at 387.
The Tubbses’ reliance on Santiago is undercut further by our statement that “[a]s a
whole, Section 8(b) states that no person can accept a fraction of a charge for services
provided, unless they have actually provided services.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Our more
recent decision in Alston only confirms that Santiago cannot bear the weight that the
Tubbses place upon it.  In Alston, we considered whether a mortgage insurance kickback
scheme was actionable under § 8 of RESPA even if the plaintiffs suffered no damages. 
585 F.3d at 755.  Examining § 8(b) in the course of our interpretation of  RESPA’s
damages provision, § 8(d), we noted:
It cannot seriously be contended that when Congress sought to differentiate
between all charges and a portion of those charges, it did not know how to
do so.  In section 8(b), for example, Congress differentiated between the
overall charge for a settlement service and “any portion, split or percentage
thereof” . . . .
Alston, 585 F.3d at 761.  Consistent with the foregoing quotation, I believe the plain
language of § 8(b) continues to refer to “a portion” of a settlement charge after Santiago.
C.
Although interpretations of § 8(b) vary slightly among courts of appeals, the
Tubbses have cited no appellate decision which has held that a plaintiff can state a claim
 The Tubbses argue that Santiago declined to follow the circuit courts which3
require a defendant to allege a split and “rejected their reasoning.”  This overstates the
nature and extent of Santiago’s disagreement with those decisions, however.  Santiago
did not disagree with the portions of Boulware, Haug, or Krazlic v. Republic Title Co.,
314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002), that hold a plaintiff must allege a split fee to state a
claim under § 8(b).  Rather, we cited those decisions in Santiago to emphasize our
disagreement with their interpretation of the phrase “no person shall give and no person
shall accept” as creating a single prohibition that requires both a culpable giver and a
culpable receiver of an unearned fee.  See 417 F.3d at 388-89.  Like the Eleventh Circuit
in Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, 348 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2003), we
interpreted that language as creating two independent prohibitions—one on giving, the
other on receiving—which in turn allowed us to find that markups, which by definition
include only a culpable receiver, are within the ambit of § 8(b).  See Santiago, 417 F.3d at
388-89.  We did not cite Boulware, Haug, or Krazlic to emphasize that we disagreed with
their assumption that § 8(b) requires a plaintiff to allege a split fee.  In fact, it would have
been unnecessary to do so, since the markup theory we approved in Santiago necessarily
included a split fee.
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for relief under §8(b) of RESPA absent an allegation that the defendant split the fee at
issue with a third party.  As the Title Agency noted, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits adhere to its view that a split fee is required.  See Boulware
v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 291 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding “§ 8(b) only
prohibits overcharges when a ‘portion’ or ‘percentage’ of the overcharge is kicked back
to or ‘split’ with a third party”); Mercado v. Calumet Fed. Sav. & Loan, 763 F.2d 269,
271 (7th Cir. 1985) (observing that §8(b)’s plain language requires a plaintiff to allege
that a defendant shared a “portion, split, or percentage” of an unearned portion of a fee
with some “other person” to state a claim); Haug v. Bank of Am., 317 F.3d 832, 836 (8th
Cir. 2003) (interpreting § 8(b) as “an anti-kickback provision that unambiguously requires
at least two parties to share a settlement fee in order to violate the statute”).3
8The Tubbses rely principally on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in  Sosa v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 348 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2003), which they claim held that
§ 8(b) of RESPA does not require a defendant to split a fee to be liable.  Sosa held no
such thing, however.  Rather, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to assume that § 8(b) required
that a defendant accept something less than an entire fee to be liable, stating: “[g]iving a
portion of a charge is prohibited regardless of whether there is a culpable acceptor, and
accepting a portion of a charge is prohibited regardless of whether there is a culpable
giver.”  Id. at 982 (emphasis added).  Thus, Sosa requires a plaintiff to allege a split fee
with a third party to state a claim under § 8(b), even if the plaintiff need not allege that
both participants were culpable actors.
The Tubbses also rely heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in Kruse, arguing it
held that § 8(b) does not require a defendant to allege a split fee to state a claim. 
Although Kruse did defer to HUD’s interpretation that § 8(b) covered markups, a markup
necessarily involves a split fee, since the defendant keeps a portion for itself and passes
the rest on to the third party that performed the service.  See Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53.  Thus,
nothing about Kruse’s approval of markups in the § 8(b) context can be read to eliminate
§ 8(b)’s textual requirement that a defendant receive only a “portion, split, or percentage”
of a fee to be liable.  Indeed, the only theory of liability that the Second Circuit held to be
“clearly and unambiguously” beyond the reach of § 8(b) was the overcharge, which by
definition involves no split fee since the defendant is alleged only to have charged too
9much for its own service.  See 383 F.3d at 56.  Accordingly, the Tubbses’ reliance on
Kruse is misplaced.
In sum, the Tubbses are unable to identify any persuasive authority in support of
their argument that they need not allege that the Title Agency split the $150 fee at issue to
state a claim under §8(b).  This is unsurprising in light of the statutory text’s requirement
that one receive a “portion, split, or percentage” of an unearned fee to be liable.
D.
In a fallback argument, the Tubbses cite a portion of our analysis in Santiago for
the proposition that their $150 payment to the Title Agency should be combined with
their $80 payment to Wachovia and regarded as a single $230 payment.  Such an
approach is required, argue the Tubbses, by the “economic reality analysis” of Santiago.
In holding that §8(b) covered both markups as well as kickbacks, Santiago noted
that “the parties would be in the same economic position” regardless of whether a
defendant engaged in a kickback or a markup scheme.  417 F.3d at 388.  Irrespective of
how the defendant subsequently divided the fee received from the plaintiff, we noted, the
plaintiff would be charged the same amount at the outset of the transaction.  Id.  Santiago
thus did not mandate any “economic reality analysis” when assessing claims under § 8(b). 
Rather, the Court simply observed that to the consumer, there was little practical
difference between a kickback and a markup when concluding that § 8(b) prohibited both
types of conduct.  Accordingly, Santiago does not require us to combine the two distinct
10
charges paid by the Tubbses into one under the vague rubric of “economic reality.”
The Tubbses’ attempt to aggregate several distinct fees into one single charge also
contravenes the text of § 8(b), which provides that “no person shall accept any portion,
split, or percentage of any charge made or received” without providing services.  12
U.S.C. § 2607(b) (emphasis added).  The text of § 8(b) contemplates a single, discrete
charge that is subsequently split, not multiple charges paid to different entities at the
outset, before they ever pass through a common defendant, which are later combined only
for the purposes of litigation.  Combining charges in this way would contradict the well-
pleaded allegations of the Tubbses’ own amended complaint, where they averred that the
fees were separately charged and paid.
Accepting the Tubbses’ economic reality theory also would vitiate the requirement
that a defendant split a fee with a third party to be liable under § 8(b).  The Tubbses
essentially ask the Court to aggregate multiple fees paid to different parties into a single
“charge.”  Under this approach, a plaintiff could always manufacture a split charge—and
thus liability under § 8(b)—simply by picking and choosing various charges from a HUD-
1A form and combining them.  I would not render § 8(b)’s requirement of a split charge
meaningless in this fashion.
II.
In conclusion, I believe the Tubbses were required to allege that the Title Agency
accepted a “portion, split, or percentage” of a fee without performing the corresponding
11
services in order to state a claim under § 8(b) of RESPA.  Nothing in Santiago suggests
otherwise.  Although the Tubbses alleged that the Title Agency received a $150 fee for
which it performed no services, they failed to allege that the Title Agency split that fee
with any third party.  Therefore, the Tubbses’ claim under § 8(b) of RESPA was properly
dismissed.  See, e.g., Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 372 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing
that we may affirm for any reason supported by the record).
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
